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ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF STATE PRE-EMPTION
OF MUNICIPAL EXCISE AND INCOME TAXES
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C. EmoRY GLANDER*
The preclusive effect of the pre-emption doctrine in the field of
municipal taxation becomes clearly apparent when viewed in relation
to the rapid spread of municipal income taxes in Ohio. The first such
ordinance was enacted by the city of Toledo in 1946. By the middle
of 1957, some twenty-seven municipalities had entered the field; and
less than three years later, with the opening of the 1960's, the number
had increased to fifty-one, including thirty-nine cities and twelve
villages.' The apparent popularity of this levy rests primarily upon
extremely practical grounds. Unlike excise taxes generally, and
although subject to limitations, it is the one form of tax which Ohio
municipalities have discovered is least vulnerable to invalidation by
the Ohio Supreme Court. The case of Angell v. City of Toledo,2
marked the turning point in a series of frustrating decisions which,
while praiseworthy in certain aspects of tax policy, defeated com-
mendable municipal efforts toward self-reliance. It is the purpose of
this article to review the origin and development of the pre-emption
doctrine and to re-evaluate it in terms of legal validity and public
policy.3
ORIGIN OF THE DOCTRINE
Municipalities in Ohio are not dependent upon legislative au-
thorization as the fountainhead of their taxing powers. Under the
home-rule amendment of the Ohio Constitution, adopted in 1912,
municipalities were granted authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government.4 These powers, the supreme court held in State
* Partner, Law Firm of Wright, Harlor, Morris, Arnold & Glander, Columbus,
Ohio; Lecturer, College of Law, The Ohio State University.
1 "Municipal Income Taxes in Ohio," January 25, 1960: Research Report, Ohio
Department of Taxation, LG-11, 2-60; 2 CCH "State Tax Reporter" (Ohio), par.
71-102d to 73-662 (1960).
2 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
3 For earlier discussions of the problem, see Glander, "The Uniform Municipal
Income Tax Act," 18 Ohio St. L.J. 489 (1957); Fordham and Mallison, "Local Income
Taxation," 11 Ohio St. L.J. 217 (1950); Glander and Dewey, "Municipal Taxation:
A Study of the Pre-emption Doctrine," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 72 (1948).
4 "Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local self-government
and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other
similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws." Ohio Const., art. XVIII,
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ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, necessarily include the powers of taxation.
"There can be no doubt that the grant of authority to exercise all
powers of local government includes the power of taxation," said the
court, "for without this power local government in cities could not
exist for a day."
But this power, as the court also pointed out, is subject "to the
staying hand of the general assembly," for the constitution also
provides that "laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities
to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes."' By what kind of
laws? It is here that the Zielonka case strikes the note which portends
the questionable aspect of the pre-emption doctrine. "It is enough to
say," said the court, "that the general assembly has not expressly
limited the authority of municipalities to levy an occupational tax,
nor has it impliedly limited such authority by invading the field on
its own account." This case involved a Cincinnati ordinance which
levied an annual occupational tax upon manufacturers of bottles and
glassware articles, and osteopathic physicians, such occupations having
been chosen for the purpose of instituting a test case. The supreme
court upheld the tax, stating in the second paragraph of the syllabus
that:
2. Under the grant of power of local self-government provided
for in Section 3, Article XVIII of the State Constitution, the City
of Cincinnati, as long as the State of Ohio through its general as-
sembly does not lay an occupational tax on businesses, trades,
vocations and professions followed in the state, may raise revenue
for local purposes, through the instrumentality of occupational
taxes.
In other words, the court held that it is not necessary for the
purpose of limiting municipal taxing powers, that the general assembly
pass a "thou shalt not" statute; it may as effectively achieve this result
by implication, "by invading the field on its own account." It is this
doctrine of pre-emption by implication, as distinguished from express
interdiction, that has long been both controversial and questionable
in respect of municipal taxation in Ohio.
§ 3. See also art. XVIII, § 7, which provides that any municipality may frame and
adopt a charter for its government and may, subject to the provisions of section 3,
supra, exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government. Both of these constitu-
tional provisions were adopted September 3, 1912.
5 99 Ohio St. 220, 124 N.E. 134 (1919).
6 Art. XVIII, § 13, adopted September 3, 1912. Note also art. XIII, § 6, which
provides that "The General Assembly shall provide for the organization of cities, and
incorporated villages, by general laws; and restrict their power of taxation, assessment,
borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the
abuse of such power."
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THE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
In the first two decisions which followed the Zielonka case, The
Globe Security & Loan Co. v. Carrel,7 and The Marion Foundry Co.
v. Landes,' both of which also involved other similar causes, the
supreme court recognized, but found no occasion to apply adversely,
the pre-emption doctrine.
The Globe Security case involved the validity of a Cincinnati
ordinance which levied an occupational tax upon the business of
lending money on chattel mortgages or wage assignments. A state
statute' then in effect required persons engaged in such business to
obtain a license from the commissioner of securities and to pay to
the state an annual license fee, and provided that "no other and
further license fee shall be required from any such licensee, by the
state or any municipality." The court held that the state statute
"while restricting the state and the municipalities of the state from
exacting further license fees in the regulation of such business, in no
way restricts the state or the municipalities from levying an excise
tax upon the business of such licensee as a revenue measure."' 0 In
its opinion the court observed that payment of the tax was not a
prerequisite to the right to engage in the particular business, and
found no conflict between the regulatory state statute and the munici-
pal taxing ordinance.
The Marion Foundry case involved an occupational tax upon
persons, firms and corporations carrying on a variety of specified
trades, professions, occupations, businesses, and employments in the
city of Marion. Actually, the case appears to have involved the
power of a municipality to levy an occupational tax and the mechanics
of such a levy rather than proscription under the pre-emption doctrine.
In upholding the tax, the court referred extensively to the Zielonka
case.
1
In City of Cincinnati v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,1 2
which also involved two other utility cases, the supreme court for the
first time invoked the doctrine of pre-emption by implication to
7 106 Ohio St. 43, 138 N.E. 364 (1922).
8 112 Ohio St. 166, 147 N.E. 302 (1925).
9 Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 6346-1, 6346-2.
1o Syllabus, par. 2, which cited with approval and followed the Zielonka case.
11 In its opinion, at page 174, the court said: "The question here is one of power
rather than of policy, and we are unable to make any distinction in principle between
the levying of an excise tax against an osteopathic physician, as was done in the case
of State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, supra, and the levying of an excise tax against any
other occupation or profession, whether such occupation or profession be designated by
name or classified, or the tax be levied against occupation generally."
12 112 Ohio St. 493, 147 N.E. 806 (1925).
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invalidate a municipal tax. In question was a Cincinnati ordinance
which levied an excise tax upon many occupations including the occu-
pation or business of operating a railroad, a telegraph company, and
a telephone company. The tax was levied at annual flat rates upon
the privilege of doing business within the city. Then existing state
statutes levied excise taxes for the privilege of carrying on intra-state
business, measured by gross receipts, upon telephone, express and
telegraph, and railroad companies.3 Speaking conjecturally concerning
the rationale of the Zielonka case, which will be hereinafter discussed,
the court held that the power of a municipality to lay occupational
taxes "does not extend to fields within such municipality which have
already been occupied by the state."' 4 In so deciding, the court relied
primarily upon the rule of stare decisis, citing not only the Zielonka
case but the Globe Security and Marion Foundry cases as well. 5 The
court also expressed some doubt as to the constitutional powers of a
municipality to levy an excise tax at all, but, referring to the Zielonka
case, said it was "neither disposed to unsettle the law by overruling
that case, nor to extend the power of municipalities in that respect
by a further interpretation removing the limitation therein expressed."
Thus, in spite of professed doubts, the court not only passed up an
opportunity to repudiate the doctrine of pre-emption by implication
but, as it has turned out, passed by the point of no return as well.
One month after the American Telephone & Telegraph case, the
supreme court decided Firestone v. City of Cambridge.6 This case
involved the levy of an annual fee by a municipal ordinance, upon
motor vehicle owners residing in the municipality, for the privilege of
operating such motor vehicles upon the streets thereof. The purpose
of the levy was to provide funds to be used for the cleaning, mainte-
nance, and repair of the streets of the municipality. At the time of the
enactment of this ordinance there were in effect state statutes which
levied an excise tax upon the owners of motor vehicles for the main-
tenance and repair of public roads, highways, and streets, and which
also provided that fifty per cent of all such taxes should be returned
to the municipality where they originated, to be used for the purpose
of street repair.17 The court held the Cambridge levy to be an.excise
13 Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 5483, 5495 and 5486.
14 Syllabus, par. 2.
15 In concluding its opinion the court said, at page 499: "To the end that the
sovereignty of the state may be superior to that of any of its subdivisions in a matter
so essential to that sovereignty as that of taxation, this court adheres to the interpreta-
tion of the power conferred by the Constitution upon municipalities to levy an excise
tax announced in State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel, supra, with the limitation therein
expressed."
16 113 Ohio St. 57, 148 N.E. 470 (1925).
17 Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 6299 et seq.
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tax, even though denominated a license fee, and hence that no munici-
pality has power to levy such an excise tax in addition to that levied
by the state for similar purposes. In so deciding, the court again
resorted to stare decisis, citing the Zielonka and American Telephone
& Telegraph decisions, although, as will be later shown, it had more
definite ideas as to rationale.
The Cincinnati occupational tax ordinance was again before the
court in two cases which were decided a month apart in 1931, with
conflicting results, namely, Stredelman v. City of Cincinnati and City
of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Oil Works Co.s In the Stredelman case,
it was contended that the particular provisions of the ordinance levy-
ing an occupational tax upon persons engaged in the business of
selling, soliciting or negotiating various forms of insurance were
invalid because the plaintiff sold insurance as agent for certain foreign
insurance companies, and brokered it as to other foreign companies,
and because all such companies paid taxes levied by the state upon
their privilege of doing business in Ohio. The plaintiff urged that the
American Telephone & Telegraph decision was fully applicable and
dispositive of the issues involved. The court held, however, that the
field of taxation had not been pre-empted because the state had levied
taxes upon the privilege accorded foreign insurance companies to do
business in Ohio or because they had paid the state license fees on
account of plaintiff's acting as their agent. In reaching this conclusion
the court emphasized certain evidential findings below which warranted
the conclusion "that plaintiff was engaged in a business of his own
within the terms of the ordinance, and therefore that the assessment
of the occupational tax upon his business does not result in an indirect
tax upon foreign corporations doing business in Ohio."
The other 1931 decision, perhaps the most disturbing of the
earlier decisions, is that of Cincinnati Oil Works Co., also involving
cases of two other oil companies. The plaintiffs in these cases owned
and operated gasoline filling stations in the city of Cincinnati. The
ordinance in question undertook to levy an excise or occupational tax
of one hundred dollars per annum upon operators of such gasoline
filling stations. After referring to most of the cases hereinbefore
discussed, the court said that it had no hesitancy in concluding that
the city tax was an excise or occupational tax, and that it was invalid
and unenforceable because the state had theretofore imposed "upon
the same parties, and others doing a like business in the city of
Cincinnati, an excise or occupational tax which completely occupied
and covered the field of taxation in which the city was attempting to
18 123 Ohio St. 542, 176 N.E. 215 (1931) and 123 Ohio St. 448, 175 N.E. 699
(1931), respectively.
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impose an additional excise or occupational tax upon the same
citizens."' Continuing, the court argued:
We are unable to appreciate any substantial merit in the claim
made by the city that the tax imposed by the state upon gasoline
sold to be used in propelling motor vehicles upon the highways of
the state is not in fact an excise or occupational tax against the
owners of filling stations selling the gasoline, but is in fact a tax
that affects only the purchasers or consumers of such gasoline, for
the reason that the purchasers and consumers pay the amount of
the tax in the purchase price paid for gasoline, and that the owner
of the filling station is simply the agent through whom the tax is
ultimately paid to the state. The state gasoline tax is imposed by
the state upon the business of the owner of the filling station, and
not upon the consumer of the gasoline.
If there were any doubt after the Oil Works case that the doctrine
of pre-emption extended beyond taxes of the same kind and included
taxes of remote consanguinity, that doubt was dispelled in Haefner
v. City of Youngstown, 9 decided fifteen years later. The ordinance
in question levied a tax of two and one-half per cent of the net rate
charged by public utilities for natural gas, electricity and water and
for local service and equipment furnished to telephone subscribers.
The ordinance also provided in substance that the tax should be added
to the consumer's bill for the specified utility service and the charges
for both tax and service collected at the same time. The tax was held
invalid under the pre-emption doctrine, the law of the case being
expressed in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the syllabus as follows:
3. Municipalities have power to levy excise taxes to raise
revenue for purely local purposes; but under Section 13, Article
XVIII of the Constitution, such power may be limited by express
statutory provisions or by implication flowing from state legisla-
tion which pre-empts the field by levying the same or a similar
excise tax.
4. By virtue of Section 5546-2, General Code, which has
levied a retail sales tax, and Section 5483, General Code, which
(supplemented by House Bill 196, 120 Ohio Laws, 123) has pro-
vided for a tax on the gross receipts of utility companies, the state
has pre-empted that field of taxation which includes, inter alia,
receipts by utility companies from natural gas, electricity and water
sold to consumers and local service and equipment furnished to
telephone subscribers.
In simple terms, the facts were these. The city imposed an
excise tax upon consumers of utility services based upon the rate
charged. The state imposed a retail sales tax upon the same con-
sumers, but exempted utility services.2 ° The state also imposed a
19 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
20 Ohio Gen. Code, § 5546-2 levied an excise tax "on each retail sale made in this
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privilege tax measured by gross receipts upon such utility companies.21
Nevertheless, the court held that the state tax legislation impliedly
pre-empted the field. In the opinion, the court said that a reason for
exempting sales by public utilities from the sales tax is found in the
fact that their gross receipts were subject to the state excise tax; that
this and other similar exemptions in the sales-tax law were in keeping
with a legislative policy of exempting sales already taxed in the same
or a similar way;22 and that "inferentially the whole legislative course
shows an intent to avoid double taxation of receipts whether they
come from sales proper or are the 'gross receipts' of utilities."
While municipal income taxes in Ohio have found support for other
reasons, it seems clear that the proscription of the excise tax fields
by Haefner and the earlier cases was the basic inducement for their
introduction into the local revenue system. Since the state had not
entered the income tax field, it was thought that municipalities would
have no difficulty in this area, and Toledo moved in first. Neverthe-
less, it took another supreme court decision to secure the right of that
and other cities to enact such levies. The deciding case was Angell v.
City of Toledo,2 3 and it involved the question of constitutional, as
distinguished from statutory, pre-emption by implication, concerning
which the court had indulged in obiter dictum in the Zielonka case.
The Ohio Constitution contains specific provisions authorizing
the state to levy an income tax and requiring that not less than fifty
per centum of any such tax so levied by the state shall be returned to
the city, village or township in which it originated.2 4 Referring to
these provisions, Judge Nichols had categorically declared the doctrine
of constitutional pre-emption in the Zielonka case,25 in these words:
It may be said in this connection that it is clearly to be implied
from the constitution that municipalities are without power to levy
an income or inheritance tax.
state of tangible personal property" with certain exceptions. Among the exceptions
there were specified in sub-section (6) sales of gas by gas companies, sales of electricity
by electric light companies, sales of water by waterworks companies, and all sales by
any other public utility defined in § 5415 of the General Code. This section included,
in addition to the above named utilities, telephone companies.
21 Ohio Gen. Code, § 5483, which imposed the gross receipts tax uIon electric light,
natural gas, waterworks, telephone and other specified utilities for the privilege of
carrying on intrastate business.
22 For example, Ohio Gen. Code, § 5546-2(3), (4) and (5) exempted sales of motor
vehicle fuel otherwise taxed under § 5527, sales of cigarettes otherwise taxed under
§ 5894-2, sales of beer otherwise taxed under §§ 6212-48 and 6212-49b, and sales of
wine otherwise taxed under § 6064-41.
23 Note 2, supram
24 Ohio Const., art. XII, §§ 8 and 9.
25 Note 5, supra, at pages 229, 229.
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This implication necessarily arises from the language of Section
9, Article XII, where we find the mandatory provision to the effect
that "not less than fifty per centum of the income and inheritance
taxes that may be collected by the state shall be returned to the
city, village or township in which said income and inheritance tax
originate."
It would seem quite certain, then, that the state alone can initiate
taxation of this character.
However, in the Angell case, the supreme court expressed a
unanimous certainty to the contrary when it held, as stated in the
first two paragraphs of the syllabus, that:
1. Ohio municipalities have the power to levy and collect in-
come taxes in the absence of the pre-emption by the general as-
sembly of the field of income taxation and subject to the power of
the general assembly to limit the power of municipalities to levy
taxes under Section 13 of Article XVIII or Section 6 of Article XIII
of the Ohio Constitution.
2. The state has not pre-empted the field of income taxation
authorized by Sections 8 and 9 of Article XII of the constitution,
and the general assembly has not, under authority of Section 13 of
Article XVIII or Section 6 of Article XIII of the constitution,
passed any law limiting the power of municipal corporations to levy
and collect income taxes.
In reaching its decision, the court found that the home-rule
amendment2 6 conferred sovereign powers of taxation upon munici-
palities subject only to the restrictive powers of the General Assembly,2"
thus resolving the lurking doubts expressed in the American Telephone
& Telegraph and the Haefner cases, supra, hereinafter more fully
discussed; and it declared that in the interpretation of the Ohio Con-
stitution an income tax is not to be treated as an excise tax.
This last stated declaration has meaningful significance when
considered in relation to the concurring opinion of Judge Taft. He
did not concur in paragraph 2 of the syllabus, stating that it is "too
broad unless 'the field of income taxation' referred to therein is
limited to that covered by the income tax levied against appellant."
The appellant had argued that the state has occupied part of the
field of income taxation by enacting the utilities excise tax measured
by gross receipts, 8 the corporation franchise tax which involves a
receipts allocation factor, 29 and an intangibles tax measured by
income yield.30 Answering this argument, Judge Taft said:
26 Note 4, supra.
27 Note 6, supra.
28 Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 5483 to 5487, indusive.
29 Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 5495 to 5499, indusive.
30 Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 5638 and 5638-1.
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The doctrine of pre-emption of a field of taxation by the state, as
preventing occupation of such field by a municipality, is based on
the apparent intention of the general assembly to be inferred from
its occupation of the particular field of taxation. When the general
assembly does occupy a particular field of taxation, it may reason-
ably be inferred that it intends to exclude municipalities from such
field. It has authority to do this under Section 13 of Article XVIII
and Section 6 of Article XIII of the constitution. However, the
occupation by the state of a small portion of a particular field of
taxation does not necessarily indicate the intention of the general
assembly to exclude municipalities from the portion of such field
not so occupied.
At this time, the court does not have before it the question as
to whether, by enactment of the state excise tax, the state fran-
chise tax or the intangible tax, the state has pre-empted a portion
of the field of income taxation....
The court had one facet of this question before it just five years
later in another Toledo case, Ohio Finance Co. v. City of Toledo,31
in which the question was presented whether the city could impose
its income tax on such portion of the net profits of a dealer in intan-
gibles, in this case a small loan company, as are derived from the
income yield of interest-bearing promissory notes. The decision of
the court was succinctly stated in the syllabus as follows:
In view of the provisions of the state tax laws, providing generally
for a tax against the owner of five percent on the income yield from
his intangibles but then providing for taxation of the shares of a
dealer in intangibles at five mills of their fair value and further
providing that such latter tax should be in lieu of all other taxes
on property such as intangibles owned by such a dealer, a munici-
pality may not impose an income tax on such portion of the net
profits of such a dealer as are derived from the income yield of
intangibles owned by such dealer.
Upon analysis of the state taxing statutes, a majority of the court
concluded, in an opinion written by Judge Taft, that the General
Assembly had clearly expressed an intent that no municipal tax shall
be imposed on income which a dealer in intangibles receives from
intangible property owned by him, even though the state intangibles
tax is a property tax measured by income yield and is not an income
tax as such. "Such an expressed legislative intention," the majority
reasoned, "should be just as effective a limitation on the power of a
municipality to tax that subject (i.e., income received from intangibles
owned) as the limitation which would be implied from the exaction
by the state of a tax on that subject. 3 2
31 163 Ohio St. 81, 125 N.E.2d 731 (1955).
32 Ohio Rev. Code § 718.01 constituting part of the Uniform Municipal Income
Tax Act, provides: "Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the levy of any
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A minority of the court thought that the majority opinion placed
too strict a limitation upon the taxing powers of a municipality. In
the dissenting opinion written by Judge Zimmerman, the minority
agreed that while the income of the ordinary taxpayer derived from
investments cannot be reached by a municipal income tax, ("the tax
is actually against income, no matter what nomenclature such tax may
be given" 33), nevertheless, the state tax upon dealers in intangibles is
actually an ad valorem property tax and not an income tax. Thus,
the minority concluded "that in order to say that the state has pre-
empted a field of taxation to the exclusion of a municipality the situa-
tion should be confined to those instances where both the state and
the municipality have imposed the same or a similar tax on the same
taxpayer."
This more liberal view of the minority in the Ohio Finance Co.
case became the prevailing view in Benua v. City of Columbus,34 the
most recent case in the current series. Here it was contended that
the city income tax ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to
rents from real property, upon the ground that a tax upon such in-
come is in fact a tax on the property itself. The court decided this
issue against the taxpayer, holding in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
syllabus as follows:
3. A municipal income tax does not become a tax on real
property by reason of the fact that the income on which the tax is
levied consists of rentals from such real property.
4. Where a municipal income tax is levied on rentals from
real property, the tax is not levied on the property from which the
income is derived, there is no invasion of an area of taxation
occupied by the state, and the doctrine of pre-emption is without
application.
In support of its position in this case, the plaintiff had relied upon
Bennett v. Evatt,35 in which Judge Matthias had said, in reference to
the Ohio tax upon productive investments, that "a tax based on the
income yield of intangible property" is not an income tax but a prop-
erty tax. From this the argumentative inference was urged that a tax
tax on income which a municipal corporation is not authorized to levy under existing
laws." It has been the opinion of the writer hereof that this provision was designed to
preserve within the municipal income tax field the vitality of the Ohio Finance Comipany
decision and any subsequent decisions of similar character. See Glander, "The Uniform
Municipal Income Tax Act," 18 Ohio St. L.J. 494.
33 But cf. Bennett v. Evatt, 145 Ohio St. 587, 62 N.E.2d 345. At page 593, Judge
Matthias stated: "Concededly a tax based on the income yield of intangible property
is not an income tax, an excise tax or a franchise tax. It necessarily is a tax upon
property .... "
34 170 Ohio St. 64, 162 N.E.2d 467 (1959).
35 Note 33, supra.
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upon the income yield of real estate, namely rentals, was in fact a tax
upon the property and, since the state was already in the property tax
field, the municipality was precluded. However, the court, speaking
through Judge Peck, its newest member and a former Tax Commis-
sioner of the state, held that "a tax levied on account of the ownership
of intangible property does not become an income tax simply because
the amount of the tax is determined from or 'based on the income
yield' of the intangible property" and that its analysis in this regard
was "no more than a reaffirmation of the point made by Judge
Matthias" in the Bennett case. Then, after citing case distinctions 36
between property taxes and income taxes, Judge Peck answered the
plaintiff's argument in these words:
In the light of the foregoing, the distinction between the Columbus
city income tax and any property tax readily becomes apparent.
The Columbus city income tax is a tax upon net profits earned,
and, as stated above, a property tax is a tax on account of owner-
ship and in the case of one type of personal property its productive
capacity is used as a means of arriving at the amount of the tax
to be assessed. In this process the tax is not shifted from the prop-
erty to the income and in the case of the Columbus city income
tax the levy is not shifted from the income to the property simply
because the former happens to be derived from the latter.
Thus, the court, six judges concurring, concluded that "the
Columbus city income tax is a tax on income and not on property and
does not intrude into a pre-empted field of property taxation." It
is interesting to note that Judge Taft alone dissented, without opinion.
One can only speculate that he sensed some basic conflict between
Judge Peck's delineation of proscribed fields of municipal taxation
and his own delineation thereof in the Ohio Finance Co. case.
There may well exist such a conflict and it might have been
brought to light had the plaintiff advanced one additional argument
which, so far as the opinions in the Benua case indicate, apparently
was not made. The state intangible tax law applies to "contractual
obligations for the periodical payment of money and other incorporeal
rights of a pecuniary nature from which income is or may be derived,
however evidenced, excepting (1) interests in land and rents and
royalties derived therefrom .... ,1 Quaere, paraphrasing Judge Taft's
language in the Ohio Finance Co. case, has the General Assembly thus
clearly expressed an intent that no tax shall be imposed on the income
36 Including New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937), in which
Mr. Justice Stone emphasized that the "incidence of a tax on income differs from that
of a tax on property. Neither tax is dependent upon the possession by the taxpayer of
the subject of the other. His income may be taxed, although he owns no property, and
his property may be taxed although it produces no income."
37 Ohio Rev. Code, § 5701.06(c).
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which a person receives from real estate that he owns, especially since
that real estate is otherwise taxed by the state? Or, as suggested (but
not actually decided) in the Haefner case,38 is the mere declaration
of exemption from a state tax as much a limitation on municipal
taxing power as the imposition of a tax by the state?
Whatever may be the ultimate answers to these somewhat esoteric
inquiries, it seems clear that, for the present at least, the court eschews
the "too strict" limitation upon the taxing powers of a municipality
and stands upon the simply stated proposition that state pre-emption
of a tax field by implication occurs only when the state has levied
"the same or a similar tax," as expressed by Judge Zimmerman in his
Ohio Finance Co. dissent and as ruled in the Haefner case. But what
is meant by a "similar" tax? This is an elastic if not ambiguous term
which easily lends itself to both strict and liberal interpretations of
the preemption doctrine, as the cases have amply illustrated.
RATIONALE OF THE DECISIONS
It is one thing to understand what the judicial doctrine of pre-
emption by implication as illustrated by the cases actually is; it is
quite another thing to understand why it exists at all. Since munici-
palities have full powers of local taxation under the home-rule amend-
ment, subject only to the power of the General Assembly to pass laws
of a limiting or restrictive character, the question repeatedly arises
why the supreme court has felt called upon throughout the years to
sanction the doctrine of implied as well as express interdiction.
Perhaps the best approach to this inquiry is to point out that
the court, despite the confident assurance of Judge Nichols in Zielonka
v. Carrel, supra, has not always been sure that the grant of all powers
of local self-government to municipalities under the home-rule amend-
ment actually carried with it the power of taxation. This lurking
doubt was succinctly expressed by Judge Robinson in City of Cin-
cinnati v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,39 the first case in
which the pre-emption doctrine was invoked to actually invalidate a
tax, in which he said:
It is sufficient to say that the decision in the Carrel case, supra,
declaring the right of the municipality to levy an excise tax at all,
was arrived at by an interpretation of the constitution rather than
by apt words therein found, and was then and since has been a
subject of some doubt.
Again, in Haefner v. City of Youngstown,40 Judge Williams reiterated
38 Note 19, supra.
39 Note 12, supra.
40 Note 19, supra.
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the same doubt and, after alluding to taxation as an attribute and
function of sovereignty, said:
The power to tax has not been expressly conferred upon munici-
palities and, were there no binding precedents, the question as to
the existence of any such power would present some difficulty, as
was pointed out by Judge Robinson in City of Cincinnati v. Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co., 112 Ohio St. 493, 147 N.E. 806.
In both of these cases, however, the court bowed to precedent, pointing
out that the doubt had been resolved in favor of the municipal taxing
power and that this must be regarded as the settled law of the state.
By the time the case of Angell v. City of Toledo41 was decided, judicial
confidence on the point had been fully restored as indicated by these
words of Judge Turner:
In the home-rule amendment to the Ohio Constitution (Article
XVIII) the sovereignty of the state was so limited as to confer
certain sovereignty upon municipalities, viz.; Sections 3 and 7 of
Article XVIII.
A fundamental power of government is the power to raise revenue.
Nevertheless, this was thirty years after Judge Nichol's first confident
expression on the point, and the doubts that apparently arose from
time to time during the intervening period with reference to the basic
taxing powers of municipalities may well have had some bearing upon
the court's general adherence to the doctrine of implied limitation.
There are, of course, evidences of more tangible and fundamental
motivations underlying the court's decisions. Although the doctrine
of pre-emption by implication was merely stated without clearly
expressed reasons in the Zielonka case, 42 and but cryptically reiterated
in the Globe Security & Loan Co. and Marian Foundry Co. cases,4 3 it
was given both conjectural and concrete rationalization in the Ameri-
can Telephone & Telegraph Co. case.44 In this case, referring to the
Zielonka case, the court suggested that it rested on one of three pos-
sible bases, saying:
Whether the court reached the decision that the levying of an
excise tax upon an occupation by the state operated as a limitation
upon the right of the municipality to levy an excise tax on the
same subject, (1) by analogy to the rule declared by the United
States Supreme Court upon the interstate commerce clause of the
federal constitution, to the effect that, with reference to the sub-
41 Note 23, supra.
42 Note 5, supra.
43 Notes 7 and 8, supra.
44 Note 12, supra.
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jects that are intrastate as well as interstate, a state may enact
laws only so long as Congress fails to act, but that when Congress
has legislated upon the subject the sovereignty of the state is super-
seded by the superior sovereignty of the United States, or (2)
whether the decision was arrived at upon the theory that the
limitations exist because of the fact that Section 3, Article XVIII,
grants to municipalities only such "powers of local self-govern-
ment ... as are not in conflict with general laws," and that when
the state has enacted general laws, such as Sections 5483, 5485,
and 5486, General Code, an ordinance attempting to tax an occu-
pation for the privilege of doing a thing for which the state has
already taxed it is for that reason in conflict with general laws, or
(3) whether the court reached the conclusion that the enactment
of Sections 5483, 5485, and 5486, General Code, operates as a
restriction on the power of taxation by the municipality, under the
provisions of Section 6, Article XIII, of the constitution, the
opinion does not disclose.
It is interesting to note that the court did not undertake in this
or other cases4" to justify the pre-emption doctrine precisely upon the
speculative reasons as above stated but instead formulated its own
philosophy in terms of the relationship which exists, or which is
thought should exist, between the state and its political subdivisions.
In this case, Judge Robinson tied the pre-emption doctrine to the
concept of state sovereignty, saying at the conclusion of the opinion:
That the levying of a tax is an exercise of sovereign power, that
the sovereignty of the state extends to each of its four corners,
within the municipalities as well as without, is not a subject of
debate; that such sovereignty would be impaired by construing the
constitution so as to give a subdivision of the state equal sover-
eignty in so important a subject as that of taxation cannot be
gainsaid.
To the end that the sovereignty of the state may be superior to
that of any of its subdivisions in a matter so essential to that
sovereignty as that of taxation, this court adheres to the interpreta-
tion of the power conferred by the constitution upon municipalities
to levy an excise tax announced in State ex rel. Zielonka v. Carrel,
supra, with the limitations therein expressed.
These are persuasive words, but one well may ask whether,
logically, they do not beg the question. Was not the sovereignty of the
state limited by the constitutional home-rule amendment "so as to
confer certain sovereignty upon municipalities," as suggested by Judge
Turner in the Angell case, supra? Whether it was so limited or not, is
not state sovereignty completely safeguarded by article XVIII, section
45 A possible exception is the Globe Security case, supra, in which the con-
flict theory was suggested. The court said: "We find no conflict between the pro-
visions of § 6346-1 et seq. and the ordinance of the city of Cincinnati as disclosed by
the record."
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13, which provides that laws may be passed by the General Assembly
to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes? In other words,
since the state may preserve its sovereign position at any time and
under any circumstances simply by enacting a prohibitive statute, is
there any logical necessity for resorting to the doctrine of pre-emption
by implication for which the constitution itself makes no express
provision?
A more cogent justification for adherence to the pre-emption
doctrine is found in the tax sharing device and legislative intent that is
deducible therefrom. This was first suggested in Firestone v. City of
Cambridge,4 6 in which the court held that a city fee imposed upon
motor vehicle owners for the privilege of using the streets was invalid
because the state had pre-empted the field by levying an excise upon
such motor vehicle owners for the same and similar purposes. In
reaching its decision, the court, after noting that under the state taxing
statute fifty per cent of the taxes collected were required to be returned
to the municipality where they originated, to be used for street pur-
poses, and that the city received about $11,000 from that source each
year, concluded with these words:
It is to be observed that the legislature not only levied this tax for
the benefit of the state, but for the benefit of municipalities as well.
No municipality has power to levy such a tax in addition to that
levied by the state for similar purposes.
While the court did not express itself directly, it seemed to suggest
that the General Assembly intended that the state tax should serve
both state and local purposes, and hence that the city levy was pro-
scribed as clearly as though a specific restrictive statute had been
enacted.
In Haefner v. City of Youngstown,47 the court again buttressed
its decision with an inference of legislative intent based upon tax
sharing, but with a somewhat different emphasis. Here, it will be
remembered, the city tax upon consumers of utility services measured
by the periodic amounts charged therefor was invalidated because the
state had levied a sales tax from which utility sales were exempted
for the reason that the gross receipts of utility companies werb subject
to another state-levied gross receipts tax. After pointing out that both
the sales tax and the gross receipts are shared taxes in that the statutes
provided for the distribution of a portion of the revenue derived there-
from to the municipalities, 4 the court then said:
Inferentially the whole legislative course shows an intent to avoid
double taxation of receipts whether they come from sales proper
46 Note 16, supra.
47 Note 19, supra.
48 Ohio Gen. Code, §§ 5546-18, 5546-19, 5491.
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or are the "gross receipts" of utilities that are subject to the excise
tax under Section 5483.
Here we should pause to inquire whether the court did not in
fact weaken its position. Legislative intent to prohibit a particular
municipal tax, inferable from a state-levied, locally-shared tax of the
same kind, may have a logical appeal standing alone, but to couple
it with the concept of double txation seems only to confuse the issue.
Double taxation is primarily a policy consideration, not a legal con-
sideration, 49 and it is in the former sense that it must be assumed the
court spoke in the Haefner case. This being true, it would seem that
intent to avoid double taxation would be a less relevant consideration
than intent to proscribe a particular municipal tax within the context
of the pre-emption doctrine.
The court itself has apparently reached the same conclusion for
it has not since talked about legislative intent to avoid double taxation,
but rather about legislative intent to interdict. This is illustrated by
the comment of Judge Taft in his concurring opinion in the Angell
case50 when he said, "The doctrine of pre-emption of a field of
taxation by the state, as preventing occupation of such field by a
municipality, is based on the apparent intention of the General As-
sembly to be inferred from its occupation of the particular field of
taxation." This reasoning, it will be noted, is barren of any reference
to tax sharing, as also is his further statement that "when the General
Assembly does occupy a particular field of taxation, it may reasonably
be inferred that it intends to exclude municipalities from such field."
These identical statements were repeated by Judge Taft in his
majority opinion in the Ohio Finance Co. case,5' and the concept was
in no way modified by the court's latest pronouncement in the Benua
case."2 Thus any critique of the pre-emption doctrine comes down at
last to this: When the General Assembly levies a particular tax, is it
reasonably to be inferred from that fact alone that the General As-
sembly intended to prohibit municipalities from levying the same or
a similar tax? Answering this question, as it must be answered, apart
from stare decisis, and apart also from all considerations of tax policy,
it is the writer's opinion that logic does not support any such inference.
Of course, where the general assembly levies a tax and provides
that the revenue to be derived therefrom shall be shared with the
municipalities, a much stronger case for pre-emption may be made be-
49 See Glander and Dewey, "Municipal Taxation: A Study of the Pre-emption
Doctrine," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 72 (1948) at pages 90-91 and cases therein cited and
discussed.
50 Note 23, supira.
51 Note 31, supra.
52 Note 34, supra.
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cause legislative intent to monopolize the field seems more logically
inferable from the mandatory tax-sharing requirements than merely
from state entry into the field. It was at least partially in this context,
let it be remembered, that the doctrine of pre-emption by implication
was conceived. For when, in the landmark case of Zielonka, Judge
Nichols uttered his now famous dictum that municipalities have no
power to levy an income or inheritance tax, he said that this implica-
tion necessarily arises from the mandatory provisions of the constitu-
tion to the effect that "not less than fifty per centum of the income and
inheritance taxes that may be collected by the state shall be returned
to the city, village or township in which said income and inheritance
tax originate." While in over-all effect the decision itself appears to
sanction pre-emption by implication where the state merely invades
the field "on its own account,1 53 the court had no occasion to expound
the doctrine beyond its inchoate stage, but rather left "the interesting
question whether both the state and municipality may occupy the same
field of taxation at the same time" for the courts to decide some day.
In suggesting that logic does not support the proposition that
occupancy of a tax field by the state justifies a reasonable inference
that the general assembly intended to exclude municipalities from that
field, the writer bases his opinion upon five propositions which, for
the sake of brevity, are stated without amplification.54
First. Municipal taxing power in Ohio is derived, not from the
General Assembly, but from the Ohio Constitution. As stated in the
Angell case, supra,: "In the home-rule amendment to the Ohio Con-
stitution (Article XVIII) the sovereignty of the state was so limited
as to confer certain sovereignty upon municipalities, viz., Sections 3
and 7 of Article XVIII." Moreover, the "certain sovereignty" so
conferred upon municipalities includes the power of taxation. As
stated in the Zielonka case, supra,: "There can be no doubt that the
grant of authority to exercise all powers of local government includes
the power of taxation, for without this power local government in
cities could not exist for a day."55
Second. There is no provision in the Ohio Constitution (or in
any higher body of fundamental law) and no decision by the Supreme
Court of Ohio save one which, apart from the restrictive powers granted
53 See also par. 2 of the syllabus, supra.
54 If it be considered that any of the five propositions is, in any particular, incon-
sistent with the analysis appearing in 9 Ohio St. L.J. (1948), it may be understood
that the conflicting view herein expressed is a modification of this writer's earlier view.
55 In the Angell case, the court echoed this same concept. In discussing the home-
rule amendment and after quoting the provisions thereof, the court said: "A fundamental
power of government is the power to raise revenue."
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to the General Assembly by article XVIII, section 13, and article
XIII, section 6, of the Ohio Constitution, would prevent both the
state and the municipalities from occupying the same field of taxation
at the same time. Except for the American Telephone & Telegraph
case, supra, in which the court would not "give a subdivision of the
state equal sovereignty in so important a subject as that of taxation,"
the sole legal basis for the pre-emption doctrine is that of express
interdiction or proscription by implication of legislative intent arising
under the aforesaid sections of articles XVIII and XIII of the Ohio
Constitution. 6
Third. The doctrine of pre-emption by implication of legislative
intent, as distinguished from express interdiction, is not necessary to
preserve the sovereignty of the state government over its municipalities
"in so important a subject as that of taxation." Such state sovereignty
is fully safeguarded by the provisions of article XVIII, section 13, of
the Ohio Constitution which was adopted at the same time the home-
rule amendment was adopted,57 and which grants to the General As-
sembly the authority at any time and under any circumstance to pass
laws to limit the power of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts
for local purposes.
Fourth. There is no express provision of the Ohio Constitution
to the effect that the enactment of a particular tax by the general
assembly shall be deemed to constitute, by any kind of inference, a
limitation upon the power of municipalities to levy the same or a
similar tax. Moreover, the words used in article XVIII, section 13,
to-wit: "Laws may be passed to limit the power of municipalities to
levy taxes . . ," when interpreted in relation to the purpose and scope
of the home-rule amendment itself, would seem to imply and require
an overt act of restriction by the General Assembly, and the absence of
such an overt act of express interdiction would seem to constitute an
acquiescence by the General Assembly in the exercise of the municipal
taxing power. This is to say, given the sovereign power to levy a tax
for municipal purposes, the exercise of such power by a municipality
should be regarded as valid by the state, even though it is also in the
field, when the state has not bothered to pass a law expressly limiting
such exercise of the municipal taxing power.
H0 Language found in par. 3 of the syllabus of State ex rel. v. Cooper, 97 Ohio St.
86, 119 N.E. 253 (1917), when considered apart from the context of the case, might also
be regarded at first blush as authority for the proposition that municipalities cannot
occupy the same tax field as the state. However, as pointed out in 9 Ohio St. LJ. 72,
92 (1948), analysis shows that the syllabus statement means nothing more than that
municipal taxing powers under the home-rule amendment "are subject to the steadying
hand of the General Assembly."
57 September 3, 1912.
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Fifth. It is theoretically possible that the doctrine of pre-emption
by implication could be invoked to utterly stifle municipal govern-
ments and render them completely subservient to the state, notwith-
standing the desire for limited autonomy which the people have
expressed in the home-rule amendment. The question well may be
posed as to what would happen in terms of public service and fiscal
solvency in the fifty-one municipalities which now have city income
taxes if the general assembly were to enact a state income tax. Absent
a provision for permissive local levies, hereinafter discussed, the
state income tax enactment would automatically invalidate the fifty-
one local levies over night, and chaos clearly could result. It is not
enough to say that this would not happen or, indeed, that it would not
be permitted to happen. The fact that it theoretically could happen,
in spite of the home-rule intentions of the people of Ohio as expressed
in the constitutional amendment which they adopted, is sufficient to
demonstrate the logical weakness, and hence the legal invalidity, of the
judicial doctrine of pre-emption by implication.
THE ASPECT OF PUBLIC POLICY
To conclude that the doctrine of pre-emption by implication is
legally unsound is not to argue that the supreme court should abandon
it now. Even though it does not withstand the tests of logic, it has been
a part of our decisional law too long to be cast aside with impunity.
There is, first of all, something to be said for stare decisis, even in these
days when judicial experimentation is sometimes considered more
respectable than historical precedent. It was recently most eloquently
said by Judge Peck in another connection when, in respect of a decision
which had been in being for but a year, he said: ". . . to so promptly
disavow a conclusion thoughtfully arrived at by this court would for
all time to come cause its decisions to be suspect as fragile, ephemeral
things. . . .This need for stability of principle has occasioned the
doctrine of stare decisis and causes it to be compelling among those
who would despair at seeing the judiciary become subservient to
whim." 38
Secondly, and of equal importance, it should be remembered
that cold logic sometimes is outweighed by other values in the minds
of men. In our present context, for example, double taxation, by
which is meant the levy of the same tax by more than one unit of
government having jurisdiction over the taxpayer, may not be illegal
or unconstitutional, but it may be both unsound and unwise as a
matter of public policy. In respect of the taxing powers of the states
under the commerce clause of the federal constitution, the avoidance
58 State ex rel. Allison v. Jones, 170 Ohio St. 323, 164 N.E.2d 417 (1960).
1960]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL[
of multiple taxation has been a matter of real and substantial judicial
concern. 9 Moreover, among the tax theoreticians there has always
been a school of thought which supports the principle of separation of
sources of revenue as between the state and local governments, not-
withstanding the fact that the impracticability of completely separating
sources of revenue has been clearly demonstrated by experience.60 It
therefore is not surprising to discover the Supreme Court of Ohio
evidencing the same concern, whether voicing it or not, by construing
the Ohio Constitution so as to avoid multiple taxation.
Even if it be argued that this is not sound adjudication in terms
either of tax law or of tax policy, it may also be argued that irreparable
harm is not the inevitable result. Even though, as has been observed,
the doctrine of pre-emption by implication could work havoc over-
night, as for example if the General Assembly should enact a state
income tax without reference to municipal income levies, the people
acting through their senators and representatives in the General
Assembly have the means at hand to permit municipalities to occupy
the same tax field as that occupied by the state. Such means consist
of permissive legislation, which could be provided by inserting in any
chosen state taxing statute a simple provision to the effect that nothing
contained therein shall be construed as expressing or imposing a
limitation on the power of a municipality to levy, assess or collect the
same or a similar tax. The validity of such legislation would seem to
be justified upon the ground that, since pre-emption by implication
is based upon legislative intent, a simple declaration of negative intent
would serve to nullify the doctrine in the particular situation.6
Legislation of this nature has been proposed. The first such
proposal was introduced in the 97th General Assembly after the
59 E.g., Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938), in
which Mr. Justice Stone first expounded and applied the "cumulative burdens" test
as an "added reason" for sustaining a New Mexico tax on the business of publishing a
magazine having an interstate circulation, measured by its gross receipts from adver-
tising. Here the court found that "the tax is not one which in form or substance can be
repeated by other states in such manner as to lay an added burden on the interstate
distribution of the magazine." The "cumulative burdens" test, or "multiple taxation"
doctrine, as it is sometimes described, had its heyday during the period from 1938 to
about 1946.
6o For an analysis of this approach to governmental financing both in Ohio and
elsewhere, and for an evaluation of alternative methods of financing local governments,
including separation of tax sources, see "A Study of the Tax and Revenue System
of the State of Ohio and its Political Subdivisions": Report of the Tax Commissioner
to the Governor and the 97th General Assembly, 1947, Chapter VI, pages 77-80.
61 For a detailed discussion of permissive legislation in this area, its methodology
and legality, see Glander and Dewey, "Municipal Taxation: A Study of the Pre-
emption Doctrine," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 72, 81-90 (1948).
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decision in the Haefner case, but it did not pass.62 The identical
proposal was last presented in the 103rd General Assembly,6 3 and
did not pass. Indeed, during the past fifteen years, this very proposal
has been repeatedly introduced, but without any results whatever.6
In addition to the foregoing technique, the 102nd General As-
sembly witnessed still another and broader approach. It was by means
of general legislation negating any pre-emption by implication result-
ing from a state-levied tax in the absence of express statutory provi-
sion therefor6 1 This, too, got nowhere.
These abortive legislative attempts to nullify the doctrine of
pre-emption by implication should be somewhat sobering to the
devotees of supreme laissez faire in the field of municipal taxation.
That the people, speaking through their chosen representatives, are
satisfied with the public or tax policy aspects of the pre-emption
doctrine now seems abundantly clear.
But, more important still, if the doctrine of pre-emption by
implication is, in the final analysis, rooted in legislative intent to pre-
empt a tax field for the state, as the later decisions imply, does not the
repeated refusal of the General Assembly to negative such intent, as it
might have done by permissive legislation, lend some little support to
the notion that, as a matter of law from the case of Zielonka to this
very moment, the supreme court has read the legislative mind aright?
62 S.B. 229, H.B. 14, 140, 97th General Assembly of Ohio.
63 H.B. No. 65, which sought to amend § 5727.38 of the Revised Code, relating to
public utility gross receipts taxes, and § 5739.02 of the Revised Code, relating to the
sales tax, by adding this language: "Nothing contained in this section shall be con-
strued as expressing or imposing a limitation on the power of a municipality to assess,
levy or collect a consumer's utility tax."
64 E.g., S.B. 229 and H.B. 14, 140, 97th General Assembly; H.B. 180, 181, 182, 98th
General Assembly; H.B. 517, 101st General Assembly; H.B. 675, 102nd General As-
sembly; H.B. 65, 103rd General Assembly; and there may have been others.
65 H.B. No. 964, which sought to enact § 1.25 of the Revised Code so as to provide
that: "The levy, by the state, of a tax shall not be deemed to pre-empt the field of
taxation in which said tax is levied, to the exclusion of a municipal tax in such field,
unless the legislation imposing the state tax specifically provides that such tax shall
pre-empt the field in which said tax is levied to the exclusion of municipal taxes in
said field."
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